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Nash equilibria are defined using uncorrelated behavioural or mixed joint probability distributions
effectively assuming that players of bounded rationality must discard information to locate equi-
libria. We propose instead that rational players will use all the information available in correlated
distributions to constrain payoff function topologies and gradients to generate novel “constrained”
equilibria, each one a backwards induction pathway optimizing payoffs in the constrained space.
In the finite iterated prisoner’s dilemma, we locate constrained equilibria maximizing payoffs via
cooperation additional to the unconstrained (Nash) equilibrium maximizing payoffs via defection.
Our approach clarifies the usual assumptions hidden in backwards induction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Payoff maximization in the single stage Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) locates a unique Nash equilibrium point,
mutual defection, which garners players a non-Pareto effi-
cient outcome. Finite repetition of this single stage game
defines the finite Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD)
which is apparently solved by inductively propagating
the single stage Nash equilibrium of mutual defection
backwards through every stage of the game to estab-
lish “All Defect” as the unique Nash equilibrium path.
This single rational play strategy prevents players from
cooperating to achieve higher payoffs. Nevertheless, in
experimental tests (see [1, 2, 3, 4]), people often coop-
erate to garner a greater payoff indicating either that
modelling in game theory is somehow incomplete or that
people behave irrationally. Many different proposals have
been made along these two lines including suggestions to
modify definitions of rationality and to bound rationality
[5, 6, 7, 8, 9], to take account of incomplete information
[10, 11, 12, 13] and uncertainty in the number of repeat
stages [14], to bound the complexity of implementable
strategies [15, 16, 17], to account for communication and
coordination costs [18], to incorporate reputation and ex-
perimentation effects [19] or secondary utility functions
as in benevolence theory [20] or in moral discussions [21],
to include adaptive learning [22] or fuzzy logic [23], or
more directly, to employ comprehensive constructions of
normal form strategy tables [24, 25, 26]. Interestingly,
quantum correlations can be introduced to resolve the
prisoner’s dilemma [27].
As noted above, these proposals generally modify the
definition of either the IPD or of player rationality to ex-
plain deviations from the single unique Nash equilibrium
pathway. By contrast, in this paper we assume Common
Knowledge of Rationality (CKR) for all players and no
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modification of the IPD game definition. Then we gener-
alize the analysis of the IPD to regimes where the fixed
point theorems underlying existing equilibria do not ap-
ply. In providing an existence proof for mixed strategy
equilibria, Nash and Kuhn made the overly restrictive as-
sumption that each player’s mixed or behavioural strat-
egy choice probability distributions were continuous and
uncorrelated and so strictly independent [28, 29]. This
assumption allowed the analytic continuation of game
payoff functions over a convex probability polytope en-
abling the use of fixed point theorems to locate mixed
strategy equilibria [28]. The subsequent widespread use
of this existence proof as a definition of “Nash equilibria”
requires rational players to locate equilibria by discarding
information inherent in correlations, in effect, an assump-
tion of “bounded” rationality. For multi-stage games,
this same assumption that players of bounded rationality
(employing myopic agents)3 must discard information by
adopting uncorrelated play allowed Kuhn to define sub-
game equilibria and subgame decompositions [29]. While
this assumption is always valid for single stage games
with an empty history set, in multistage games the joint
strategy choice probability distributions of all players can
be more generally correlated through being conditioned
on game history sets, with these correlations invalidat-
ing the a priori assumption of uncorrelated mixed or be-
havioural strategies. Hence, we propose that players of
unbounded rationality, in contrast to those of “bounded”
rationality, will make use of all available information by
exploiting correlated mixed or behavioural joint strategy
choice probability distributions to optimize payoffs.
In this paper, by considering broader classes of corre-
lated joint probability distributions, we significantly gen-
eralize the analysis of the IPD at the cost of a greater an-
alytic complexity stemming for instance, from the non-
applicability of fixed point theorems. It may be ques-
tioned whether this cost is a price worth paying. How-
ever, we have seen little in the literature considering
regimes where these a priori assumptions are invalid,
though these regimes might provide the mathematical
2arena to model broader classes of experimental game be-
haviours. Especially so given that well established tech-
niques for manipulating conditioned and correlated joint
probability distributions exist.
Previous efforts to model correlated strategy choices
have attempted this task discursively—see for instance
the descriptive derivations of strategy function equilibria
in differential games [30] and trigger function equilibria
in supergames where players encourage adherence to a
cooperation pathway using deviations to “trigger” cred-
ible punishments [31, 32, 33, 34, 35]. These previous
treatments have strongly insisted that players prespecify
an outcome for absolutely every possible (and impossi-
ble) situation that might arise in a supergame—for jus-
tifying quotations, see note [36]. As a result, current
supergame analysis must either assume that all mixed
or behavioural strategy choice variables are independent
and optimized via a Nash procedure, or that all variables
are fully specified by strategy functions which are them-
selves independently selected and again optimized via a
Nash procedure.
This paper fills in the missing middle ground here, and
considers correlated mixed or behavioural joint proba-
bility distributions conditioned by sets of strategy func-
tions which specify only some fraction of the possible
variables (defining a dependent set) while leaving the re-
maining variables unspecified (an independent set) to be
optimized by standard Nash techniques. (Here, the de-
pendent variables are described by correlated probabil-
ity distributions conditioned on game history sets.) As
such, we introduce no additional properties to the IPD
and our use of strategy functions and Nash optimiza-
tion techniques are entirely standard. Optimizing func-
tions over a set of independent variables given a set of
constrained dependent variables is the subject matter of
constrained optimization theory as in Lagrange multi-
pliers [39, 40], variational calculus [41, 42, 43], and dy-
namic programming [44]. Each adopted constraint set
generalizes the a priori assumption made by Nash and
Kuhn that each player’s mixed or behavioural strategy
choice probability distributions are uncorrelated and sep-
arable. In fact, Nash and Kuhn’s multistage analysis cor-
responds to the special case where the constraint set is
empty, and Nash equilibria are defined only for empty
constraint sets. Hence, in our generalized analysis (as in
any constrained optimization procedure), we must first
take account of applied constraint sets prior to locating
“constrained equilibria” in the constrained probability
space. (We note that games with mixed strategies con-
strained to lie within convex hyperpolyhedron by linear
inequalities and equations have been considered in Refs.
[45, 46].)
To avoid any confusion about our generalization, we
first review the original Nash equilibrium definitions in
the next section (II), and then generalize these defini-
tions to define constrained equilibria applicable to non-
empty constraint sets in the section following (III). In
section IV, we derive constrained equilibria in the IPD,
and observe the different player behaviours arising from
adopted constraints. Further, we apply the Nash equi-
libria definitions on the constrained equilibrium space to
specify global equilibria. Finally we discuss the role of
the backwards induction argument as it is applied to fi-
nite supergames in section V.
II. REVIEW OF NASH EQUILIBRIA
Throughout this paper, we consider supergames
formed by finitely iterating a single stage game over
1 ≤ n ≤ N stages where each stage is played between two
non-communicating rational players denoted Px and Py.
In the nth stage, players Px and Py choose their respec-
tive stage strategies, denoted xn and yn, from the same
strategy set S, that is xn, yn ∈ S, where S = {s1, . . . , ss}
and s is the total number of strategies, or alternatively,
S = {s|s ∈ R, s1 ≤ s ≤ ss} when strategy choice is con-
tinuous. Game history sets Hn known to both players
in stage (n + 1) record occurring events with H0 = ∅,
and Hn = {x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn}. The payoffs Πx and
Πy for players Px and Py are each specified as map-
pings (or functions) from the set of all chosen strategies
HN = {x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN} to the real line [47, 48]
via
Πz = Πz(x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN), z ∈ {x, y}. (1)
We consider supergames where these mappings are de-
fined as summations of the respective nth stage player
payoffs pix(xn, yn) ≥ 0 and piy(xn, yn) ≥ 0 assumed non-
negative without loss of generality, giving
Πz =
N∑
n=1
piz(xn, yn), z ∈ {x, y}, (2)
nominally functions of 2N variables {x1, . . . , xN} and
{y1, . . . , yN}. The goal of each player is to maximize
their respective total payoff functions Πx and Πy.
Strategy choices are defined as a functional mapping
from the game history sets Hn to the strategy set S,
which specify after each history the specific strategy
choices xn and yn to be selected [47, 48]. Thus, following
standard definitions [47]:
A pure strategy [xn] of player [Px] is a func-
tion
xn : Hn−1 → S = {s1, s2, . . .}. (3)
In Ref. [28], Nash defined mixed strategy equilibria
in terms of expected value payoff functions. The most
general possible expected payoff functions are
〈Πz〉 =
ss∑
x1...xN ,y1...yN=s1
P (x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN )
×Πz(x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN) (4)
3for z ∈ {x, y}, and where the probability that player Px
(Py) chooses strategy choice xn ∈ S (yn ∈ S) in stage n
for 1 ≤ n ≤ N is P (x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN). Here, the av-
erage is calculated over an ensemble of trials representing
every possible circumstance and outcome. In particular,
the total ensemble consists of an infinite number of sub-
ensembles, one for every possible joint probability dis-
tribution, each one of which contains an infinite number
of trial outcomes. This is in accord with von Neumann
and Morgenstern’s definition of a strategy as “a complete
plan: a plan which specifies what choices [a player] will
make in every possible situation, for every possible ac-
tual information which [that player] may possess at that
moment” [49]. We emphasize that a player’s complete
strategy list is not synonymous with a mere listing of all
the possible choices determining every pathway through
the complete game tree despite this common usage in Ref.
[49]—such a listing is missing information. A full listing
of every possible situation which might occur will contain
a successive listing of all the many possible joint strategy
choice probability distributions which might be adopted
by the players as well as subsidiary information about
all the possible pathways through the associated game
tree generated under those adopted distributions. If the
information about the joint probability distributions is
absent, this is equivalent to making a default assumption
that all pathways are equally weighted (as conversely,
differing joint probability distributions weight pathways
differently). In actuality, discarding information about
adopted joint probability distributions is equivalent to
an assumption of bounded rationality, and the neces-
sity of such restrictions has never been demonstrated.
In particular, von Neumann and Morgenstern specifi-
cally asserted that they were using a method of “indi-
rect proof” to imagine the form of a successful theory
and to test the consequences for problems and contra-
dictions [49]. Naturally, such contradictions were never
found as restricting the solution space to a valid sub-
ensemble ensures the absence of contradictions though
at the expense of incomplete results. In this paper we
do not make this unjustified assumption. As usual then,
using P (A and B) = P (A)P (B|A) we have
P (x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN ) = P1x(x1)P1y(y1)×
×P (x2, . . . , y2, . . . |H1), (5)
and the iterated identity
P (xn, . . . , xN , yn, . . . , yN |Hn−1) = Pnx(xn|Hn−1)×
Pny(yn|Hn−1)P (xn+1, . . . , yn+1, . . . |Hn), (6)
successively applied for all n. Here, same stage choices
xn and yn are independent events conditioned on the his-
tory setHn−1 and so potentially correlated. We also elect
here to maintain the time ordering of conditioning events,
though this is not necessary—probability distributions
can be pre- or post-conditioned, so two events A and B
occurring at two different times have joint probability
P (A and B) = P (A)P (B|A) = P (B)P (A|B). So also,
a player in their pregame analysis can condition events
in one stage n on either earlier or later stage events as
desired. The most general possible expected payoff func-
tions are then
〈Πz〉 =
∑
s1≤xn,yn≤ss
Hn−1
P (Hn−1)P (xn, yn|Hn−1)Πz(x1, . . .)
=
∑
x1...xN
y1...yN
P1x(x1)P1y(y1)× . . .× PNx(xN |HN−1)
×PNy(yN |HN−1)Πz(x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN )
=
N∑
n=1
∑
x1...xn
y1...yn
P1x(x1)P1y(y1)× . . .
×Pnx(xn|Hn−1)Pny(yn|Hn−1)piz(xn, yn), (7)
for z ∈ {x, y}. Each of the conditioned distributions
Pnz(zn|Hn−1) can be written as a list of potentially cor-
related behavioural strategy distributions
Pnz(zn|Hn−1) =


Pnz,H′
n−1
(zn), if Hn−1 = H
′
n−1
Pnz,H′′
n−1
(zn), if Hn−1 = H
′′
n−1
...
...,
(8)
with up to 22(n−1) entries, one for each possible history
set Hn−1. The individual distributions Pnz,Hn−1(zn) and
Pn′z′,Hn′−1(z
′
n′) can still be correlated as when, for in-
stance, a single “dice” is used to determine both out-
comes. (For completeness, note [50] lists the definitions
of correlated variables in terms of their covariance, vari-
ance and means.) Such correlations further imply that
these distributions are not necessarily continuous. These
potentially correlated behavioural strategy distributions
allow writing the most general expected payoff functions
as
〈Πz〉 =
∑
x1...xN
y1...yN
P1x(x1)P1y(y1)× . . .× PNx,HN−1(xN )
×PNy,HN−1(yN )Πz(x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN ).(9)
Here, all possible contingent histories have been taken
into account weighted by their respective conditioned
probabilities. Players can now seek to optimize their pay-
offs by applying any relevant optimization technique to
these general expected payoff functions. Of course, if
the functions are correlated and discontinuous then fixed
point theorems cannot be used to locate optima, and
also, if the variables are correlated it is absolutely nec-
essary to resolve the correlations as imposed constraints
prior to applying any optimization procedure. That is,
if correlations exist, any optimization procedure such as
backwards induction must take those correlations into
account as imposed constraints before seeking to derive
an optimal pathway.
4Given these most general expected value payoff func-
tions, we now revisit the definition of Nash equilibria
as developed by Nash [28] and as explicated by Kuhn
[29]. When introducing behavioral strategies Kuhn “ex-
plicitly assumed that the choices of alternatives at dif-
ferent history sets are made independently. Thus it
might be reasonable to call them ‘uncorrelated’ or ‘lo-
cally randomized’ strategies.” [29]. Such uncorrelated
behavioral strategies capture the myopic viewpoint of
non-communicating agents possessing “a local perspec-
tive [which] decentralizes the strategy decision of player
i into a number of local decisions.” [51]. In this, the
agent-normal game form, myopic agents at each history
set determine paths through the game tree using prob-
ability distributions which are uncorrelated and inde-
pendent. This assumption allowed Kuhn to prove the
equivalence of uncorrelated behavioural strategies and
the uncorrelated mixed strategies introduced by Nash in
games of perfect recall [29]. This equivalence was es-
tablished by recognizing that player Px (Py) could in-
dex all their possible pure strategies by parameter α (β)
with the probability of playing that strategy being Px(α)
(Py(β)) given by an appropriate product of the uncorre-
lated behavioural stategies Pnx,Hn−1(xn) (Pny,Hn−1(yn)).
This then allowed writing the non-general expected pay-
off functions as
〈Πz〉 =
∑
αβ
Px(α)Py(β)Πz(α, β) (10)
for z ∈ {x, y} where here, the summation is over an ap-
propriately limited set of α and β values. Nash consid-
ered the mixed strategies Px(α) and Py(β) as “a collec-
tion of non-negative numbers which have unit sum and
are in one to one correspondence with his pure strate-
gies.” so the expected payoff functions were linear in
the mixed strategies for each player allowing optimiza-
tion over a “convex subset of a real vector space” via
fixed point theorems [28]. This definition follows that
of von Neumann and Morgenstern [49] in establishing a
one to one correspondence between a player’s pure and
mixed strategies which are subject to appropriate nor-
malization constraints but to no other constraints such
as might result from using fully general joint strategy
choice probability distributions. Of course, these restric-
tive assumptions limit the ensemble over which payoff
averages are calculated, and in the full ensemble corre-
lated behavioural strategies can break the one-to-one cor-
respondence between the mixed strategies and the full set
of uncorrelated pure strategies, can render expected pay-
off functions discontinuous, and can invalidate the use of
fixed point theorems as an optimization technique.
The assumption that players employ uncorrelated
mixed or behavioural strategy choices then allows the
definition of Nash equilibria in terms of the probabilities
p¯ ≡ {Px(α), ∀α} and q¯ ≡ {Py(β), ∀β}. Following Nash
[28],
If and only if each player’s mixed or be-
havioural strategy choices are uncorrelated
and independent, then a 2-tuple (p¯∗, q¯∗) of
unconditioned probability distributions forms
a mixed strategy equilibrium point if and only
if for all players,
〈Πx(p¯
∗, q¯∗)〉 = max
∀p¯
[〈Πx(p¯, q¯
∗)〉]
〈Πy(p¯
∗, q¯∗)〉 = max
∀q¯
[〈Πy(p¯
∗, q¯)〉]. (11)
Thus an equilibrium point is a 2-tuple (p¯∗, q¯∗)
such that each player’s pure strategy maxi-
mizes their payoff if the strategies of the oth-
ers are held fixed. Thus each player’s strategy
is optimal against those of the others [28].
We note here that Nash proved an existence theorem
in Ref. [28] and not a uniqueness theorem, and it is
well known that when the restrictive assumptions are not
made then mixed strategy equilibria do not necessarily
exist [37, 38, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56].
Pure strategy Nash equilibria can be defined by further
specializing the strategy choice probability distributions
to be either zero or one, Px(α), Py(β) ∈ {0, 1} for all
values of α and β, so one or another pure strategy is in-
dependently chosen by each player with certainty. Then
pure strategy Nash equilibria can be defined following
Nash [28]:
If and only if each player’s pure strategy
choices are uncorrelated and independent,
then a 2-tuple (α∗, β∗) is a pure strategy equi-
librium point if and only if for all players,
Πx(α
∗, β∗) = max
∀α
[Πx(α, β
∗)]
Πy(α
∗, β∗) = max
∀β
[Πy(α
∗, β)]. (12)
Another situation where the Nash definition can be
applied is when all variables are fully specified by strat-
egy functions which are themselves independently se-
lected. In this case, strategy choices are conditioned
on earlier events and so possibly correlated in any
stage despite being chosen independently by each player
[30, 31, 32, 33, 34]. However strategy functions intro-
duced in these approaches are very limited in the sense
that any implemented strategy function set must fully
specify an outcome for every stage and every possible
situation which might arise in a game. (For justifying
quotations see [36].) Because players Px and Py inde-
pendently choose sets of N strategy functions denoted
Ax = {xn : Hn−1 → S, 1 ≤ n ≤ N} and similarly for Ay
to generate payoffs Πz(Ax,Ay) for z = {x, y}, it is pos-
sible to define strategy function Nash equilibria [28, 30]:
If and only if all 2N strategy choice vari-
ables are functionally specified, a 2-tuple
strategy profile φ = {A∗x,A
∗
y} is a strategy
function Nash equilibria if and only if for all
5players,
Πx(A
∗
x,A
∗
y) = max
∀Ax
[Πx(Ax,A
∗
y)]
Πy(A
∗
x,A
∗
y) = max
∀Ay
[Πy(A
∗
x,Ay)]. (13)
Essentially equivalent definitions underly trigger function
equilibria [30, 31, 32, 33, 34].
Based on the equilibria definitions above, supergame
analysis must either assume that all variables are inde-
pendent and optimized via a Nash procedure, or that
all variables are fully specified by strategy functions. To
treat more general strategy functions, it is necessary to
extend the Nash equilibrium concept to regimes where
fixed point theorems are inapplicable. The next section
does this by defining new constrained equilibria.
III. CONSTRAINED EQUILIBRIA
In this section we define constrained equilibria through
allowing the use of correlated multivariate probability
distributions to optimize expected payoffs.
We note firstly that neither Nash nor Kuhn provided
any rationale requiring rational players to restrict the
size of the ensemble used to calculate payoff averages by
only employing uncorrelated mixed or behavioural prob-
ability distributions. Likely, this assumption was made
in the context of an existence proof to simplify analysis
as the fully general treatment of correlated multivariate
probability distributions is difficult. However, adopting
correlated distributions can often greatly simplify anal-
ysis. Consider that when events A and B are perfectly
correlated, the joint probability of both events reduces
to P (A and B) = P (A)P (B|A) = P (A), so one vari-
able entirely disappears reducing the dimensionality of
the problem space and simplifying the problem. (This
dimensionality reduction is a normal result whenever con-
straints are applied in optimization problems.)
In fact, any assumption that players must adopt the
restricted ensemble available under uncorrelated play is
equivalent to a claim that players must discard infor-
mation and so amounts to an assumption of bounded
rationality. (For completeness, note [57] details the mu-
tual information content of correlated joint probability
distributions.) How might rational players exploit the
information in correlated distributions? A minimum nec-
essary condition for the existence of an equilibrium point
is that opponents must be unable to improve their pay-
offs by altering their strategy choices, so essentially, op-
ponent’s payoff function “gradients” must be negative
at equilibrium points. Now, rational players can exploit
correlations to constrain the payoff function space topol-
ogy so as to alter the possible directions in which payoff
functions can change. As “gradients” can only be taken
along allowed directions, such constraints alter the pay-
off function “gradients” at any point. Thus, it is possible
for rational players to choose correlations to alter payoff
function “gradients” to generate novel equilibria at novel
points. In this paper, we assume that rational players
will make use of all available information including that
implicit in correlated joint probability distributions.
In this paper, constrained equilibria are defined for
pairs of sets of strategy functions {{Xn}, {Yn}}. For the
pure strategy case, these strategy functions Zn may be
represented as
xn = Xn(x1, . . . , xn−1, y1, . . . , yn−1)
yn = Yn(x1, . . . , xn−1, y1, . . . , yn−1). (14)
Here xn and yn might be independent variables
or dependent on some or all of the variables
x1, . . . , xn−1, y1, . . . , yn−1. For the pure strategy case,
neither these variables nor the strategy functions are
probabilistic. In terms of conditioned probability dis-
tributions, these constraints take the form
Pnx(xn|Hn−1) = δxn,Xn(Hn−1)
Pny(yn|Hn−1) = δyn,Yn(Hn−1), (15)
where δa,b is one if a = b and zero otherwise. (Of
course, more general distributions could be considered.)
These functional notations, though widely used to rep-
resent payoff functions, have not been widely employed
for strategy functions. We note that it has been
used in the derivation of best reply (strategy) functions
[34, 38], Stackelberg duopolies [38], a two-stage prisoner’s
dilemma [58], correlation in randomized strategies [56],
and differential games [30], while a number of texts de-
scribe strategies as “functions” without actually intro-
ducing a function notation [37, 46, 47, 48].
Suppose player Px (or Py) chooses a set of strat-
egy functions, which we might conveniently call their
algorithm denoted as Ax = {Xm, . . . , Xk} (or Ay =
{Yn, . . . , Yj}), to constrain some (or none) of their strat-
egy choice variables creating a set of dependent variables
and a remaining set of independent variables. For nota-
tional convenience, we relabel the independent variable
sets for Px and Py as respectively α¯ = {u1, . . . , uxˆ} ∈ S×xˆ
and β¯ = {v1, . . . , vyˆ} ∈ S×yˆ where 0 < xˆ + yˆ ≤ 2N .
We assume here that at least one variable remains in-
dependent as otherwise, the optimization becomes triv-
ial. Immediately then, the payoff functions for the play-
ers become composite with reduced dimensionality (and
changed properties) given by
Πz → Πz(α¯, β¯), z ∈ {x, y}. (16)
Here, no dependent variables, such as x2 = X2(x1, y1)
say, appear in the composite payoff functions.
With the representation of strategy functions in terms
of the independent variables, the Nash equilibrium defini-
tion can be applied to the space of independent variables
to define pure strategy constrained equilibria via:
Given a particular constraint set Ax and Ay ,
a 2-tuple (α¯∗, β¯∗) is a pure strategy con-
6strained equilibria if and only if for all players,
Πx(α¯
∗, β¯∗) = max
∀α¯
[Πx(α¯, β¯
∗)]
Πy(α¯
∗, β¯∗) = max
∀β¯
[Πy(α¯
∗, β¯)]. (17)
We now generalize this definition to mixed strategy
constrained equilibria. In this case, strategies at any
stage can be probabilistic, so the strategy functions of
Eqs. (14) and (15) applied at stage n map each history
set Hn−1 to a probability distribution. The set of these
probabilistic strategy functions Pnz(zn|Hn−1) forms an
algorithm Az. For a pair of algorithms {Ax,Ay}, the
expected total payoffs given as Eq. (4) can be rewritten
in terms of independent probability distributions {p¯, q¯}
only, where p¯ = {p1, . . .} specifies the probability that
any allowed value of α¯ is implemented, while q¯ = {q1, . . .}
specifies the probability that any allowed value of β¯ is im-
plemented. Here we used the same relabelling as in the
pure strategy case above. Then, we can define mixed
strategy constrained equilibria as:
Given a particular constraint set Ax and Ay,
a 2-tuple (p¯∗, q¯∗) is a mixed strategy con-
strained equilibria if and only if for all players,
〈Πx(p¯
∗, q¯∗)〉 = max
∀p¯
[〈Πx(p¯, q¯
∗)〉]
〈Πy(p¯
∗, q¯∗)〉 = max
∀q¯
[〈Πy(p¯
∗, q¯)〉]. (18)
As is usual in optimization theory, every alternate
strategy function set {Ax,Ay} imposes constraints on ei-
ther the space of possible pure strategy choice variables
or the space of possible mixed strategy probability dis-
tributions. Geometrically, these constraints take a cross-
section onto some subspace wherein all constraints are
satisfied, and in which the composite payoff functions
exhibit changed continuity properties and altered max-
ima. The composite payoff functions of reduced dimen-
sionality define pruned extensive form game trees involv-
ing only independent variables—variational optimization
techniques can only ever be applied to independent vari-
ables. Consequently, subgame decompositions, and Nash
equilibria can be applied to extensive form game trees
only after these have been pruned of dependent variables.
As is usual in constrained optimization problems, dif-
ferent constraint sets generate novel trees defining novel
equilibria. In the next section we demonstrate how these
new equilibria emerge in the IPD analysis. A question
which might arise here is how to determine the best equi-
librium among these new equilibria. As is well known in
game theory, in general, there is no simple way to choose
between many alternate Nash equilibria [26, 37, 38, 59].
However, through the example of an IPD in the next
section, we will show a way to address this issue using
standard Nash techniques.
IV. CONSTRAINED EQUILIBRIA IN THE
FINITE ITERATED PRISONER’S DILEMMA
In this section we determine constrained equilibria in
the finite IPD and demonstrate that cooperation can
naturally emerge as a consequence of constraints. In
this supergame, each player has two possible single stage
strategy choices S = {C,D} for Cooperate and De-
fect respectively with stage payoffs pix(xn, yn) ≥ 0 and
piy(xn, yn) ≥ 0 determined by the payoff matrix
Py
Px
(pix, piy) C D
C (2, 2) (0, 3)
D (3, 0) (1, 1).
(19)
This payoff matrix defines single stage payoff functions
pix(xn, yn) = 2 + xn − 2yn
piy(xn, yn) = 2− 2xn + yn, (20)
where zn represents the strategy choice for player Pz such
that 0 represents cooperation and 1 represents defection.
Total game payoffs of a finite IPD of the length N are
then
Πx(x1 . . . xN , y1 . . . yN ) =
N∑
n=1
(2 + xn − 2yn)
Πy(x1 . . . xN , y1 . . . yN ) =
N∑
n=1
(2− 2xn + yn). (21)
Following Eq. 7, the expected payoff functions for players
Px and Py are then
〈Πx〉 = 2N +
N∑
n=1
∑
x1...xn
y1...yn
P1x(x1)P1y(y1)× . . .
×Pnx,Hn−1(xn)Pny,Hn−1(yn)(xn − 2yn),
〈Πy〉 = 2N +
N∑
n=1
∑
x1...xn
y1...yn
P1x(x1)P1y(y1)× . . . (22)
×Pnx,Hn−1(xn)Pny,Hn−1(yn)(−2xn + yn).
We now derive the unconstrained Nash equilibrium for
the IPD after applying the assumption of bounded ra-
tionality so all probability distributions are uncorrelated.
We first note that the total rate of change of the expected
payoff function with respect to the changing probability
distributions is
d〈Πz〉
d
[
Pnz,Hn−1(1)
] = ∂〈Πz〉
∂
[
Pnz,Hn−1(1)
] − ∂〈Πz〉
∂
[
Pnz,Hn−1(0)
]
(23)
due to the normalization constraint Pnz,Hn−1(0) =
1 − Pnz,Hn−1(1). The shorthand notation Hn =
7{Hn−1, xn, yn} and some algebra allows writing the op-
timization conditions for player Px as the set of simulta-
neous equations
d〈Πx〉
d[P1x(1)]
= . . . ,
...
d〈Πx〉
d[P(N−1)x,HN−2(1)]
= 1 +
∑
x1...xN−2
y1...yN−2
P1x(x1) . . . P(N−2)y,HN−3(yN−2)×
∑
yN−1
P(N−1)y,HN−2(yN−1)
∑
xNyN
(xN − 2yN)×
[ PNx,{HN−2,1,yN−1}(xN )PNy,{HN−2,1,yN−1}(yN )−
PNx,{HN−2,0,yN−1}(xN )PNy,{HN−2,0,yN−1}(yN ) ] ,
d〈Πx〉
d[PNx,HN−1(1)]
= 1. (24)
The equivalent simultaneous optimization conditions for
player Py are
d〈Πy〉
d[P1y(1)]
= . . . ,
...
d〈Πy〉
d[P(N−1)y,HN−2(1)]
= 1 +
∑
x1...xN−2
y1...yN−2
P1x(x1) . . . P(N−2)y,HN−3(yN−2)×
∑
xN−1
P(N−1)x,HN−2(xN−1)
∑
xNyN
(yN − 2xN )×
[ PNx,{HN−2,xN−1,1}(xN )PNy,{HN−2,xN−1,1}(yN )−
PNx,{HN−2,xN−1,0}(xN )PNy,{HN−2,xN−1,0}(yN ) ] ,
d〈Πy〉
d[PNy,HN−1(1)]
= 1. (25)
Subsequently each player, denoted Pz , solves their re-
spective sets of simultaneous equations to maximize their
payoff by setting PNz,HN−1 = 1 for all history sets
HN−1, and by setting P(N−1)z,HN−2 = 1 for all his-
tory sets HN−2, and so on. The final result is that
both players defect at every stage giving the optima as
(xn, yn) = (1, 1) ≡ (D,D) for all n. At this point, payoffs
are (〈Πx〉, 〈Πy〉) = (N,N).
Now, we generate constrained equilibria using corre-
lated distributions in the most general expected payoff
functions of Eq. (7). As a first step, we consider player
Px adopts Markovian-like (MKV) strategy functions de-
pendent only on the results of the previous stage via
xn = Xn(yn−1) = yn−1, (26)
for 2 ≤ n ≤ N . We assume Py adopts an empty
constraint set so all Pny,Hn−1(yn) distributions are in-
dependent. The imposed constraints are equivalent to
the correlated probability distributions Pnx(xn|Hn−1) =
δxn,yn−1 , so the most general expected payoff functions
become
〈Πz〉 =
∑
x1,y1,...,yN
P1x(x1)P1y(y1)P2y(y2|H1)× . . .
×PNy(yN |HN−1)Πz(x1, y1, . . . , yN ) (27)
for z ∈ {x, y}, with generated payoffs
Πx(x1, y1, . . . , yN ) = 2N + x1 −
N−1∑
n=1
yn − 2yN
Πy(x1, y1, . . . , yN ) = 2N − 2x1 −
N−1∑
n=1
yn + yN .(28)
The expected payoff functions for players Px and Py are
then
〈Πx〉 = 2N +
∑
x1
P1x(x1)x1 +
−
N−1∑
n=1
∑
y1...yn
P1y(y1) . . . Pny,Hn−1(yn)yn +
−2
∑
y1...yN
P1y(y1) . . . PNy,HN−1(yN )yN ,
〈Πy〉 = 2N − 2
∑
x1
P1x(x1)x1 + (29)
−
N−1∑
n=1
∑
y1...yn
P1y(y1) . . . Pny,Hn−1(yn)yn +
∑
y1...yN
P1y(y1) . . . PNy,HN−1(yN )yN .
The generated constrained equilibria are now calculated
by applying the assumption of bounded rationality so all
remaining distributions are uncorrelated. Immediately
then, player Px optimizes their expected payoff via sat-
isfying the condition
d〈Πx〉
d[P1x(1)]
= 1. (30)
Consequently, player Px optimizes their first and final
stage payoff by setting P1x(1) = 1 and so defects in this
first stage. The shorthand notation Hn = {Hn−1, yn}
for n ≥ 1 and some algebra allows writing the optimiza-
tion conditions for player Py as the set of simultaneous
equations
d〈Πy〉
d[P1y(1)]
= . . . ,
...
d〈Πy〉
d[P(N−1)y,HN−2(1)]
= −1 +
+
∑
y1...yN−2
P1y(y1) . . . P(N−2)y,HN−3(yN−2)×
8∑
yN
yN
[
PNy,{HN−2,1}(yN )− PNy,{HN−2,0}(yN )
]
,
d〈Πy〉
d[PNy,HN−1(1)]
= 1. (31)
Hence, player Py optimizes their payoff by setting
PNy,HN−1(1) = 1 for every history set HN−1, and by
setting P(N−1)y,HN−2(1) = 0 for every history set HN−2,
and eventually by setting Pny,Hn−1(1) = 0 for 1 ≤ n ≤
(N − 1). These conditions locate the constrained equi-
libria at the point (x1, y1, . . . , yN ) = (1, 0, . . . , 0, 1) gen-
erating the play sequence
(xn, yn) = (D,C)(C,C) . . . (C,C)(C,D) (32)
to give expected payoffs (〈Πx〉, 〈Πy〉) = (2N−1, 2N−1).
Here, player Px defects in the first stage as their opponent
cannot respond without decreasing their payoff, while Py
can defect in the last stage when Px can no longer re-
spond.
Next we treat another combination of constraints as-
suming the Markovian strategy algorithms for both play-
ers as
xn = yn−1
yn = xn−1, (33)
for 2 ≤ n ≤ N , equivalent to the conditioned
probability distributions Pnx(xn|Hn−1) = δxn,yn−1 and
Pny(yn|Hn−1) = δyn,xn−1 . These constraint sets project
the most general expected payoff functions to
〈Πz〉 =
∑
x1,y1
P1x(x1)P1y(y1)Πz(x1, y1) (34)
for z ∈ {x, y}, where for a given play sequence (x1, y1),
the payoffs are
Πx =


2N − N2 x1 −
N
2 y1, N even
2N − N−32 x1 −
N+3
2 y1, N odd
Πy =


2N − N2 x1 −
N
2 y1, N even
2N − N+32 x1 −
N−3
2 y1, N odd.
(35)
The N stage supergame has now been exactly reduced to
a single stage game with variables x1 and y1 with payoff
matrices, for N even of
Py
Px
(Πx,Πy) C D
C (2N, 2N) (32N,
3
2N)
D (32N,
3
2N) (N,N),
(36)
and for odd N of
Py
Px
(Πx,Πy) C D
C (2N, 2N) 32 [N − 1, N + 1]
D 32 [N + 1, N − 1] (N,N).
(37)
Here, the constraining strategy functions have changed
the off-diagonal elements of the effective payoff matrix to
modify equilibria. As usual, the generated constrained
equilibria are now calculated by applying the assumption
of bounded rationality so all remaining distributions are
uncorrelated. The expected payoff functions are then
〈Πx〉 =


2N − N2 P1x(1)−
N
2 P1y(1), N even
2N − N−32 P1x(1)−
N+3
2 P1y(1), N odd
〈Πy〉 =


2N − N2 P1x(1)−
N
2 P1y(1), N even
2N − N+32 P1x(1)−
N−3
2 P1y(1), N odd.
(38)
As usual, the constrained equilibria are located via
∂〈Πx〉
∂[P1x(1)]
=


−N2 , N even
− 12 (N − 3), N odd
∂〈Πy〉
∂[P1y(1)]
=


−N2 , N even
− 12 (N − 3), N odd.
(39)
These conditions select the equilibrium points P1x(1) = 0
and P1y(1) = 0 or (x1, y1) = (0, 0) ≡ (C,C) for ei-
ther N even or for N odd and greater than 3, while for
N = 1 the equilibria is P1x(1) = 1 and P1y(1) = 1 or
(x1, y1) = (1, 1) ≡ (D,D). When N = 3 these con-
ditions are satisfied for any values of (x1, y1) requiring
examination of actual payoffs motivating the selection
(x1, y1) = (0, 0) ≡ (C,C). The generated sequences of
play are
N (x1, y1) (〈Πx〉, 〈Πy〉)
1 (1, 1) (DD) (1, 1)
N ≥ 2 (0, 0) (CC) . . . (CC) (2N, 2N).
(40)
The shear number of possible strategy functions which
might be adopted make it necessary to consider more gen-
eral functional classes. To this end, we consider that each
player adopts a mixed Markovian-Independent strategy,
denoted MKV-kI, where the MKV strategy is chosen
from the first to (N−k)-th stages while kI indicates that
IND strategies are adopted for the last k stages. For
player Px then, an MKV-kI strategy sets
xn =


yn−1 2 ≤ n ≤ N − k
x1, xN−k+1, . . . , xN independent.
(41)
Similar strategy functions denoted MKV-jI are imple-
mented by Py. These constraints are equivalent to
the correlated probability distributions Pnx(xn|Hn−1) =
δxn,yn−1 for 2 ≤ n ≤ N −k and Pny(yn|Hn−1) = δyn,xn−1
for 2 ≤ n ≤ N − j.
9(〈Πx〉, 〈Πy〉) j = 0 1 2 3 4 · · · N − 2 N − 1
k = 0 N¨, N¨ N¨−2, N¨+1 = = = · · · N¨−2, N¨+1/−2 N¨−1, N¨−1
1 N¨+1, N¨−2 N¨−1, N¨−1 N¨−3, N¨ = = · · · N¨−3, N¨+0/−3 N¨−2, N¨−2
2 ” N¨ , N¨−3 N¨−2, N¨−2 N¨−4, N¨−1 = · · · N¨−4, N¨−1/−4 N¨−3, N¨−3
3 ” ” N¨−1, N¨−4 N¨−3, N¨−3 N¨−5, N¨−2 · · · N¨−5, N¨−2/−5 N¨−4, N¨−4
4 ” ” ” N¨−2, N¨−5 N¨−4, N¨−4 · · · N¨−6, N¨−3/−6 N¨−5, N¨−5
...
...
...
...
...
... · · ·
...
...
N − 4 ” ” ” ” N¨−3, N¨−6 · · · N˙+2, N˙+5/+2 N˙+3, N˙+3
N − 3 N¨+1/−2, N¨−2 N¨+0/−3, N¨−3 N¨−1/−4, N¨−4 N¨−2/−5, N¨−5 N¨−3/−6, N¨−6 · · · N˙+1, N˙+4/+1 N˙+2, N˙+2
N − 2 ” ” ” ” ” · · · N˙+2, N˙+2 N˙+1, N˙+1
N − 1 N¨−1, N¨−1 N¨−2, N¨−2 N¨−3, N¨−3 N¨−4, N¨−4 N¨−5, N¨−5 · · · N˙+1, N˙+1 N˙ , N˙ .
TABLE I: A partial listing of constrained equilibria for the IPD when player Px implements a Markovian strategy algorithm
MKV-kI, while player Py implements an MKV-jI algorithm. Here, every shown payoff pair is a constrained equilibrium point
making selection of a single best payoff maximization strategy difficult. For brevity, we restrict consideration to large N > 8
say, and write N˙±k = (N ± k) and N¨±k = (2N ± k). Fractional indices (+k/ − j) indicate alternate equilibria with payoff
increments of +k and −j respectively. Ditto signs (”) and equal signs (=) copy values downwards and to the right respectively.
The general MKV-kI strategy subsumes a number of
other strategy functions of interest. For instance, setting
k = N − 1 or k = N makes all variables independent
(IND), so MKV-(N − 1)I=MKV-N I=IND. More inter-
estingly, this strategies subsumes certain deterministic
strategies. To see this, suppose that players consider a
deterministic strategy choice D in the last stage, and so
implement the strategyMKV-1D. More generally, players
may also consider strategies MKV-kD forcing the choice
D in the last k stages. However, it is not difficult to see
that this class of deterministic strategies is weakly dom-
inated by the class of MKV-kI. For the same k, MKV-kI
guarantees an equal or larger payoff than achievable us-
ing MKV-kD against any strategy algorithm of the oppo-
nent. In particular, the motivation to defect at the last
stage for a larger payoff is taken into account in the strat-
egy class MKV-kI. Exactly similar considerations estab-
lish that MKV-kI strategies weakly dominate Tit-For-Tat
strategies which specify cooperation in the first stage.
Although the class of strategies MKV-kI is small in
comparison to the set of all possible strategies, it con-
tains enough complexity to demonstrate novel equilibria
in the IPD. We consider player Px to implement strategy
function MKV-kI, while player Py implements MKV-jI,
so the most general expected payoff functions become
〈Πz〉 =
∑
x1,xN−k+1,...,xN
y1,yN−j+1,...yN
P1x(x1)P1y(y1)× . . .
. . .× PNy,HN−1(yN )Πz (42)
for z ∈ {x, y}, where the payoffs for a given play sequence
(x1, xN−k+1, . . . , xN , y1, yN−j+1 . . . , yN) are
Πz = 2N +
N∑
n=1
Aznxn +
N∑
n=1
Bznyn (43)
with variables Azn and Bzn as specified in Appendix A.
The assumption of bounded rationality and that all re-
maining distributions are uncorrelated now allows calcu-
lating the respective constrained equilibria with the op-
timized payoffs as shown in Table I for all combinations
of k and j.
Every listed payoff pair in Table I is an actual con-
strained equilibrium point optimizing payoffs given im-
posed constraints. As noted previously, there is no gener-
ally accepted method to choose between alternate Nash
equilibria. However, strategy algorithms are indepen-
dently selectable by each player, so we can think that
these strategy algorithms and constrained equilibria cre-
ate a new game defined by Table I. In this game on the
constrained equilibrium space, each strategy algorithm
becomes a strategy choice, and each equilibrium point
becomes a pair of payoffs. In the case where each pair
of strategy algorithms defines unique equilibrium pay-
offs, it is obvious that this table can be considered as a
game matrix. Hence standard Nash techniques can be
applied to determine global equilibria among the located
constrained equilibria. However, we note that in general
we have to take care to deal with multiple equilibria gen-
erated by a pair of strategy algorithms. By applying the
Nash equilibrium definition to Table I, we obtain global
equilibria at (k, j) for either k = 0 and 3 ≤ j ≤ (N − 2),
or j = 0 and 3 ≤ k ≤ (N − 2).
These global equilibria can be considered rational for
the IPD in this restricted class of strategies, and there is
no established way to select a particular one among these.
The more important feature given from this analysis is
that cooperation naturally arises from these equilibria.
The pathways produced by these equilibria are domi-
nated by cooperation apart from some different choices
at the last stage. This cooperative behaviour is caused
by the imposition of strategy function constraints.
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V. CORRELATED PLAY AND THE LAST
STAGE OF THE IPD
In the previous sections, we have emphasized the im-
portance of correlated play in supergame analysis and
the assumption of independent mixed or behavioural
strategy choice variables required by the Nash equi-
librium definition. Although experiments on the IPD
(and other games) have shown significantly different be-
haviours from that predicted by the Nash analysis, there
has been little motivation to revise this assumption and
extend the Nash definition of equilibrium to a fully cor-
related analysis. Many alternate approaches have been
proposed, and the field has developed in the direction
of explaining why people do not behave as rationally as
they could. In the IPD this explanatory emphasis re-
sulted largely because of the typical use of the backwards
induction (BI) argument. However, the results obtained
by our general correlated analysis differ from the predic-
tions of the typical BI argument, implying misuse of the
BI optimizing technique in application to the IPD anal-
ysis. In this section we clarify the confusion introduced
by the typical BI argument in the IPD analysis.
As noted, BI is based on dynamic programming tech-
niques, and like any variational optimization technique,
it is applied only to uncorrelated independent variables.
That is, any correlations or constraints must be resolved
before optimization commences. Necessarily then, BI
must derive the same solution as the Nash analysis un-
der the same assumed constraint set. As typically used,
the BI argument in the IPD is commonly used to justify
the assumption of independent variables underlying the
Nash equilibrium solution. As is well known, the ratio-
nale commences with the last stage of a finite supergame.
In the typical BI argument, the last stage has a special
role, and the rest of the argument follows in exactly the
way by iteration. In particular, the usual claim is that BI
requires that the last stage of an IPD is to be considered
an independent stage. It is argued that, although there
are many reasons for players to cooperate, such as the
presence of any of long range considerations [20], repu-
tation effects [60], off-equilibrium pathway signals [61],
or punishments and rewards [59], at the last stage none
of these are present. Hence, it is claimed, the last stage
is an independent stage, i.e. a single PD. Once we have
accepted the last stage as a single PD, then under CKR,
BI automatically derives the unique Nash path. In this
sense, BI is a complement of the Nash analysis to estab-
lish the Nash unique solution of the IPD. This argument
would succeed with the addition of a proof that these,
and only these effects permitted correlated play. Unfor-
tunately, this is not the case.
The significant difference introduced by allowing ratio-
nal players to adopt correlated play whenever that turns
out to be payoff maximizing, is that they will consider the
IPD as a whole, which they are able to do as unbounded
rational agents. The correlated analysis in the previous
sections has shown that the first step of the BI argument
about the last stage is not necessarily optimal. In addi-
tion, CKR by itself specifies nothing about whether the
last stage of an IPD is or is not equivalent to a single
stage game. However, under CKR, players of unbounded
rationality must take account of the payoffs available un-
der correlated play. In general then, the typical usage of a
BI argument to justify a Nash pathway as being optimal
is not correct under CKR and correlated strategies are
required for an optimal solution. For the typical BI ar-
gument to justify the Nash pathway as uniquely optimal,
it is necessary that the game analysis, and hence CKR,
is restricted to a particular kind of correlation, namely
the assumption of independent variables. Even though
there are apparently no overt motivations for players to
cooperate in the last stage, it is not optimal and hence
not rational for players to even consider “what should we
do if we are at the last stage?”.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper defines novel constrained equilibria in the
middle ground between current definitions which require
that supergame strategy choices be either all indepen-
dent or all fully specified by strategy functions. We em-
ploy standard conditioned history expansions of the joint
correlated probability distributions describing expected
payoff functions which specify only some (or no) strat-
egy choice variables (a dependent set) in terms of other
variables (an independent set). We then apply standard
optimization procedures such as Nash equilibria proce-
dures or backwards induction to the composite payoff
functions defined over the remaining independent vari-
ables to locate novel constrained equilibria. The meth-
ods developed in this paper ensure that there is no con-
flict between game theoretic optimization techniques and
more general variational optimization procedures. We
derive novel constrained equilibria in the finite iterated
prisoner’s dilemma showing in particular, that backwards
induction establishes that it can be payoff maximizing to
cooperate in the finite IPD including in the last stage of
this game. These results contrast with existing claims
that payoff maximization requires defection in this last
stage, but these results all depend on the a priori assump-
tion that choice variables are uncorrelated. We conclude
by discussing the validity of typical arguments proving
that ALL DEFECT is the privileged optimal pathway in
the IPD.
This paper derived novel constrained equilibria using
general Markovian-like strategy functions, and a broader
analysis of the many possible unknown contingent strate-
gies requires a functional representation for algorithms.
A mathematical functional analysis would allow us to
consider multiple algorithms using a functional metric
to measure the ability of different algorithms to deter-
mine supergame outcomes. However, the utility of such
a functional analysis remains an open question and will
be dealt with in later work.
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Game theory was originally proposed to provide a sim-
ple analytic environment for economic and social inter-
actions and the analysis of this paper has broader ap-
plication to this wider sphere. For instance, constrained
equilibria eliminates the first-mover advantage in iterated
bargaining games and explains experimental observations
of more equitable play. In such applications however, the
lack of a systematic way to select a particular equilib-
rium among others becomes a more serious and impor-
tant problem. This issue and the broader application to
economics, social games and evolutionary games will be
addressed in later work.
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APPENDIX A: CONSTRAINED EQUILIBRIA IN THE IPD
Suppose player Px adopts an MKV-kI strategy and player Py adopts an MKV-jI strategy function leaving inde-
pendent variables (x1, xN−k+1, . . . , xN ) and (y1, yN−j+1, . . . , yN ), where we also assume N ≥ 3.
For 1 ≤ k ≤ (N − 1) and j = 0, the independent variables are (x1, xN−k+1, . . . , xN ) and y1, and payoffs are
Πx =


2N + k−N2 x1 +
k−4−N
2 y1 −
∑N−1
n=N−k+1 xn + xN , (N − k) even
2N + k−1−N2 x1 +
k−3−N
2 y1 −
∑N−1
n=N−k+1 xn + xN , (N − k) odd.
Πy =


2N + k−N2 x1 +
2+k−N
2 y1 −
∑N−1
n=N−k+1 xn − 2xN , (N − k) even
2N + k−1−N2 x1 +
3+k−N
2 y1 −
∑N−1
n=N−k+1 xn − 2xN , (N − k) odd.
(A1)
For 1 ≤ k ≤ (N − 1) and j = (N − 1), the independent variables are (x1, xN−k+1, . . . , xN ) and (y1, . . . , yN ), and
payoffs are
Πx = 2N + x1 +
N∑
n=N−k+1
xn −
N−k−1∑
n=1
yn − 2
N∑
n=N−k
yn,
Πy = 2N − 2x1 − 2
N∑
n=N−k+1
xn −
N−k−1∑
n=1
yn +
N∑
n=N−k
yn. (A2)
For 1 ≤ k = j ≤ (N − 1), the independent variables are (x1, xN−k+1, . . . , xN ) and (y1, yN−k+1, . . . , yN), and payoffs
are
Πx =


2N + k−N2 x1 +
k−N
2 y1 +
∑N
n=N−k+1 xn − 2
∑N
n=N−k+1 yn, (N − k) even
2N + 3+k−N2 x1 +
k−3−N
2 y1 +
∑N
n=N−k+1 xn − 2
∑N
n=N−k+1 yn, (N − k) odd
Πy =


2N + k−N2 x1 +
k−N
2 y1 − 2
∑N
n=N−k+1 xn +
∑N
n=N−k+1 yn, (N − k) even
2N + k−3−N2 x1 +
3+k−N
2 y1 − 2
∑N
n=N−k+1 xn +
∑N
n=N−k+1 yn, (N − k) odd.
(A3)
For 1 ≤ k ≤ (N − 1) and 1 ≤ j ≤ (N − 1) with k > j, the independent variables are (x1, xN−k+1, . . . , xN ) and
(y1, yN−j+1, . . . , yN ), and payoffs are
Πx =


2N + k−N2 x1 +
k−4−N
2 y1 −
∑N−j−1
n=N−k+1 xn +
∑N
n=N−j xn − 2
∑N
n=N−j+1 yn, (N − k) even
2N + k−1−N2 x1 +
k−3−N
2 y1 −
∑N−j−1
n=N−k+1 xn +
∑N
n=N−j xn − 2
∑N
n=N−j+1 yn, (N − k) odd
Πy =


2N + k−N2 x1 +
2+k−N
2 y1 −
∑N−j−1
n=N−k+1 xn − 2
∑N
n=N−j xn +
∑N
n=N−j+1 yn, (N − k) even
2N + k−1−N2 x1 +
3+k−N
2 y1 −
∑N−j−1
n=N−k+1 xn − 2
∑N
n=N−j xn +
∑N
n=N−j+1 yn, (N − k) odd.
(A4)
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